The United Nations Security Council has signed off on the so-called “Trump peace plan” for Gaza. In a vote on Nov. 17, the body approved a draft resolution submitted by the U.S. endorsing a large-scale reconstruction and governance framework for the Gaza Strip, including an international “Stabilization Force” and a provisional governing body. Thirteen of the Security Council’s 15 member states voted yes, while China and Russia abstained.
At first glance, the resolution appears to offer a “pathway to Palestinian statehood” and a mechanism to lift Gaza out of the ruins. But a far more sobering reading is required: This is yet another instance of external powers crafting a “solution” for Palestine—with minimal Palestinian agency, extensive U.S. strategic control, and the complicity of Arab states that once proudly claimed anti-imperialist and pan-Arab solidarity credentials.
The resolution authorizes:
- A transitional governing body, the so-called “Board of Peace,” which will oversee Gaza’s reconstruction, governance, and donor coordination (with the U.S. at the helm and Donald Trump himself in the chairman’s role).
- An “International Stabilization Force” (ISF) authorized to enter Gaza and assume security, border control, and demilitarization tasks—under the UN mandate, but dominated in design by the U.S. draft.
- A vague “credible pathway” to Palestinian self-determination and statehood only after benchmarked “reform” of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and successful redevelopment of Gaza.
- Provisions for Israeli withdrawal tied to conditions of demilitarization and ISF milestones.
While the plan may appear to be a step forward, it is actually deeply flawed.
- Self-determination deferred and conditional
The language on Palestinian statehood is not a firm commitment but a conditional “may finally be in place” scenario. The PA must first “reform” and Gaza must be “redeveloped”—both vague terms—before any credible pathway to statehood is triggered. That amounts to subordinating the right to self-determination to externally-defined technical or administrative benchmarks, rather than recognizing it as a political and historic right. This effectively delays and dilutes the core Palestinian demand: an independent sovereign state, based on land, resources, refugee rights, and political equality—not subject to a U.S./UN “transition” regime.
- Governance by external trusteeship
Rather than empowering Palestinian institutions directly, the plan places Gaza under a kind of trusteeship: the Board of Peace and an international force hold the key levers of governance and security. True sovereignty must include democratic accountability, control over internal security and borders, and the capacity to resist external interference. This model instead replicates a colonial template: rehabilitation of territory under external oversight, not liberation.
- Security first, rights second—demilitarization as pre-condition
The ISF’s mandate includes disarming Hamas and other armed groups, securing borders, and overseeing demilitarization. But again: The underlying questions of occupation, settlement, blockade, Gaza’s economic strangulation, and the West Bank’s future are sidelined. For many Palestinians, resistance (military or otherwise) is rooted in the context of living under occupation. To treat disarmament as the pre-condition for statehood without addressing occupation structurally is to place the cart before the horse.
- Omission of the West Bank and fragmentation of the Palestinian polity
Critically, the plan focuses on Gaza alone; there is little reference to how Gaza and the West Bank are to be politically united or how the PA will be fully involved. France lamented that the West Bank is virtually ignored. This reinforces fragmentation of Palestinian society, undermines a coherent national liberation strategy, and risks turning Gaza into a separate “pilot zone” under international control while the West Bank remains under occupation. Historically, this fragmentation is exactly what has prevented Palestinian self-determination from being realized.
- Arab states’ complicity and the erosion of anti-imperialist credentials
Perhaps more chillingly for the region’s politics, several Arab and Muslim-majority states signed onto the plan (or the joint statement backing it) alongside the U.S., effectively providing cover for a resolution that many Palestinians regard as externally imposed. The governments of Qatar, Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan, and Turkey all called for “swift adoption” of the U.S. proposal.
These governments have thereby abandoned the stronger language for Palestinian statehood that had been originally demanded and accepted a watered-down compromise. From a historical anti-imperialist view, this marks another moment in which these governments behave as “junior partners” in U.S. strategy rather than as independent champions of Palestinian liberation.
Inside Palestine, opinion among the major political forces is split. The Palestinian Authority supported the measure, while Hamas rejected what it called a “guardianship mechanism.”
This latest resolution must be read against the backdrop of the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine (Resolution 181) of 1947. That landmark decision, which was made by the UN without genuine Palestinian input (the Palestinians were not a member state, and their leadership rejected the plan), laid the groundwork for decades of dispossession, occupation, and conflict.
The pattern is clear: An international body (the UN) imposes a structural framework on Palestine (in 1947 and now 2025) in which external state-actors define the rules, the boundaries, the governance, and the “transition”—rather than the Palestinian people themselves. What changed in 1947 was not just partition but the notion that Palestinian rights could be subsumed under an international diplomatic architecture rather than achieved through Palestinian self-liberation.
This current resolution repeats that architecture under a new brand: trustee governance, international force, conditional statehood. The lesson from 1947 remains: External imposition rarely leads to justice, sovereignty, or dignity for the colonized.
What does this mean going forward?
Implementation risks: Without credible Palestinian leadership and consent, the ISF and Board may lack legitimacy. As mentioned, the major political forces inside Palestine are divided over the plan.
Statehood deferred: The “pathway” to statehood is indefinite. If benchmarks are not met (which are vaguely defined), Gaza risks being stuck in a permanent limbo under international “stabilization” rather than moving to full sovereignty.
Palestinian legitimacy crisis: If the resolution proceeds without real Palestinian democratic institution-building, Gaza could see governance by technocrats, international administrators, and foreign troops, further weakening the popular legitimacy of Palestinian leadership.
Fragmentation continues: The sidelining of the West Bank, and the isolation of Gaza as a separate project, risk entrenching the division of the Palestinian body politic and the geographic disconnect between Gaza and the West Bank. It’s important to note that currently Israel has stepped up is ethnic cleansing of the West Bank, and Palestinian residents of the territory increasingly face violent pogroms at the hands of Israeli settlers.
The UN’s approval of the U.S.-proposed Gaza roadmap does not mark a triumph of Palestinian self-determination. Rather, it is a new manifestation of the old pattern: international frameworks crafted by great powers, supported (or tolerated) by regional states, with Palestinians once again in the position of subjects rather than sovereign actors.
From 1947 to 2025 the script has tragically persisted. The promise of statehood, sovereignty, and dignity remains conditional, mediated, and delayed. If Palestinian liberation is to mean anything, it must demand not just “stabilization” but control, not just governance by others but self-governance, not just the possibility of statehood but the actual exercise of it.
For Palestinians, the UN resolution stands not as a victory but as a cautionary tale: The risk is that Gaza becomes a zone of international tutelage rather than a fully sovereign Palestinian territory. Arab states that once thundered with rhetoric for solidarity with Palestine and against imperialist interference now quietly sign up. The UN, meant to be an instrument of international justice, once again becomes a mechanism for managing rather than resolving colonial legacies.
As with all op-eds published by People’s World, the views expressed here are those of the author.
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